This paper conducts an event study of the impact of multilateral debt relief initiatives announcements on the stock prices of South African companies with subsidiaries in countries benefited by these initiatives. It shows that these prices increase significantly above those of other firms, especially around the launching of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. These price increases are consistent with lower expected levels of future taxation in the benefited countries and provide evidence of the economic consequences of multilateral debt relief that is robust to reverse causality between economic performance and the decision to grant debt relief.
I. Introduction
O N July 8, 2005, the heads of state and government of the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, U.K., announced the launching of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), whereby they agreed to cancel the historical debt of the world's poorest countries with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Since multilateral institutions had become these countries' main creditors, the initiative, with an estimated debt write-off of $50 billion, or about 70% of these countries' total stock of debt, was expected to provide substantial debt relief (International Development Agency and International Monetary Fund, 2006) . However, what the broader public probably does not know is that although drawing broader media coverage and celebrity attention than its predecessors, the MDRI is just the latest incarnation of a series of efforts to relieve poor countries' financial obligations with multilateral institutions through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, set in motion in 1996 and modified (clearly) in 1999 (which I refer to here as enhanced HIPC).
Humanitarian motives for debt relief are clearly behind numerous calls from religious leaders, celebrities, and intellectuals arguing that it is morally wrong to collect debt from countries at the brink of starvation. However, the case for debt relief is also typically argued on the grounds that current debt burdens trap poor countries in a situation of debt overhang, where socially and privately profitable investment opportunities are forgone because of the implicit tax on their returns imposed by previous debt obligations (Krugman, 1988; Calvo & Sachs, 1989) . Firms anticipating the high future taxes
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Since, according to the debt overhang argument, debt relief should be associated with increased private and social investment and better macroeconomic performance, many researchers have looked for the impact of debt relief on growth and investment. However, finding causal evidence of this impact using aggregate data is difficult because countries that receive debt relief are not random; countries with extremely high levels of debt and bad economic performance are more likely to receive it. Therefore, one could find a negative correlation between debt relief and growth in aggregate data, even if it actually improves the prospects of countries that receive it. Of course, it may also be the case that countries with good economic prospects get debt relief, in which case finding a positive correlation between debt relief and economic performance does not provide evidence that the former causes the latter. Moreover, even if there is a causal link, debt relief will likely affect economic performance with a delay that makes identifying the impact using time series variation difficult. For these reasons, evidence based on aggregate data has to either just report correlations or depend on strong identification assumptions.
This paper provides new evidence of the impact of multilateral debt relief initiatives using an event study to determine the effect of these initiatives on firms with operations in the countries they benefited. This approach has several advantages over studies based on aggregated data because it is much less likely to be affected by reverse causality and takes advantage of the forward-looking nature of stock prices to deal with the timing problems. The approach relies on the standard assumption that stock prices quickly reflect the market's view of the impact of these initiatives on the value of firms that operate in these countries. So if these firms' values improve as a consequence of debt forgiveness, there should be an abnormal increase in their stock prices around major debt relief announcements.
Debt relief can have an impact on the value of firms operating in benefited countries by reducing their expected taxes or raising their expected gross profits. In the absence of severe contractions in public expenditure, repaying large levels of public debt requires high tax revenues. In poor countries, where income taxes are hard to impose, taxes tend to fall on companies. 1 Therefore, as long as markets assign a positive probability to the debt repayment, the relief should reduce expected taxation and directly increase the value of firms operating in these countries. Furthermore, debt relief may also increase these firms' gross profits because lower expected taxation may lead them to increase their own investment or because higher expected aggregate demand resulting from higher net resource flows or increased incentives for public and aggregate private investment may lead to an increase in their own demand. If any of these channels is in operation, an event study of the stock price response of publicly traded companies operating in HIPC countries around dates of debt relief announcements provides an indirect test of the hypothesis that debt relief has a positive effect on these countries' economic prospects.
Since HIPC countries typically lack well-functioning and liquid stock markets, this paper follows Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) and studies the response of stock prices of multinational firms with subsidiaries and operations on HIPC countries, but that are traded in foreign, more developed financial markets. In particular, it focuses on South African multinational companies traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), one of the largest and most active emerging stock markets that also provides meaningful price data daily. Focusing on South African multinationals has the additional advantage that these companies are smaller than global multinationals operating in African HIPC countries. Therefore, their operations in these countries are relatively more important and their share prices more likely to respond to events affecting their subsidiaries. 2 To implement this approach, I build a detailed chronology of the multilateral debt relief initiatives that allows me to identify the dates of different announcements related to the three major initiatives implemented since 1996 (HIPC, enhanced HIPC, and MDRI), including the dates when individual countries reached any of the milestones considered in the HIPC framework (decision points and completion points). I also gather stock price data for a sample of 35 South African multinational companies with 187 subsidiaries and operations in eighteen African HIPC countries during the period 1995 to 2006, when the various stages of the initiatives took place. I use these data to estimate a two-factor return model and measure the abnormal returns of these companies around the dates of the announcements, and to formally test the hypothesis that these abnormal returns are equal to 0 in applying various parametric and nonparametric procedures.
The results show that stock prices of South African multinationals with operations in HIPC-eligible African countries exhibit an abnormal and statistically significant increase around the announcement dates of major debt relief initiatives. The magnitude of the increase is also economically significant, with the announcements resulting in a cumulative abnormal return of about 1 percentage point for the typical parent company. Considering that the parent companies are usually at least an order of magnitude larger than their affected subsidiaries, these results suggest a two-digit cumulative impact on the value of local operations.
Evidence comparing the various stages of multilateral debt relief programs indicates that the MDRI, and to a lesser extent the enhanced HIPC, had a larger impact on HIPC-connected multinational companies than the original HIPC initiative. Also, country-specific announcements of the achievement of the various milestones of the broad HIPC program (decision and completion points) have little impact on firms' returns, although there is some evidence that reports of a country reaching completion point have a positive impact on the stock prices of related multinationals. Furthermore, the stock price response takes place mainly around the formal announcements of the launching of the major initiatives in the G8 summit meetings, with little evidence of stock reactions around the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, where the final details of the implementation are disclosed.
Consistent with the interpretation that the increase in stock prices is related to financial markets' reassessment of the value of firms operating in countries benefited by debt relief programs, the increase in stock returns is larger among South African multinational companies that are relatively more exposed to the events, as measured by the total employment in subsidiaries located in eligible countries as a fraction of the employment of the parent company. This comparison strengthens the causal interpretation of the findings, since it implicitly controls for any potential common effect affecting all companies with operations in HIPC countries or multinational firms in general.
The stock price response to major debt relief announcements of parent companies in different industries suggests that the underlying increase in value is mainly related to the expectation of lower future taxes rather than improved economic prospects. Companies in resource extraction industries, which are more likely to be the target of taxation and are less dependent on local economic conditions, exhibit a significantly larger stock price increase than companies in service industries, where the relevance of local economic conditions in relation to taxes reverses. This finding also indicates that the stock price response is not a mechanical response to potential real exchange rate appreciation associated with debt forgiveness (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005a , 2005b .
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that financial markets view the announcements of major debt relief initiatives as positive news for firms operating in benefited countries, resulting mainly from a reduction in expected taxes or the probability of expropriation, which is consistent with the debt overhang hypothesis of the costs of excessive debt. It must be noted that the perceived improvement of economic prospects of firms operating in countries receiving debt relief does not necessarily signal an improvement in the 1264 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS economic prospects of these countries because the binding constraint for investment in these countries may not be debt overhang but poor institutions (Arslanalp & Henry, 2006) . Nevertheless, the reduction of one barrier to investment can still be interpreted as an improvement in economic conditions, even if that barrier is not the most pressing one at the moment. Furthermore, the paper shows some anecdotal evidence that domestic aggregate demand was also expected to expand and that foreign investment in African HIPC countries increased around the announcement of the MDRI, and it did it faster than in the rest of the sub-Saharan African countries, which is consistent with debt overhang having some impact on investment in these countries.
This paper relates to the empirical literature on sovereign debt overhang and the impact of debt relief. Several papers in this literature have used aggregate data to test the debt overhang hypothesis by looking at the relation between debt levels and growth or investment (Claessens, 1990; Deshpande, 1997; Cordella, Ricci, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2005; Imbs & Ranciere, 2005) and have identified different thresholds over which debt burden is negatively correlated with growth, and in some cases further thresholds above which debt has no growth effect (Cordella, Ricci, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2005) . A slightly different line of research has been followed by Depetris-Chauvin and Kraay (2005) , who instead of looking at the relation between debt levels and macroeconomic performance directly study the growth effect of debt relief, finding little evidence that countries experiencing relatively larger reductions in their stock of debt tend to grow faster. While these papers provide interesting results, their reliance on aggregate data exposes them to the econometric problems arising from reverse causality and from debt relief not being randomly assigned to countries, and that they have to rely on various econometric techniques and strong identification assumptions to move from correlation to causality.
Indirect but stronger evidence on the impact of debt relief was provided by Arslanalp and Henry (2005) , who also use an event study approach to show that the stock market indexes of countries benefited by the Brady Plan significantly increased relative to a control group after the announcement of the plan. 3 However, since HIPC countries typically lack stock markets, Arslanalp and Henry (2005) do not apply their methodology to estimate the impact of the HIPC initiative and rely instead on indirect arguments to conjecture that HIPC countries are unlikely to benefit from the type of debt relief provided by the Brady Plan because investment in these countries is constrained not by debt overhang but by bad institutions (Arslanalp and Henry, 2006 ). An additional concern with this paper is that they look only at aggregate country-level indicators, so their estimates may be contaminated by the endogeneity of the decision to extend the Brady 3 The Brady Plan was a program for restructuring the debt of Latin American countries after the debt crisis of the 1980s. The plan was articulated by U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady and roughly consisted of the conversion and rescheduling of syndicated bank loans into bands-the so-called Brady Bonds. See Arslanalp and Henry (2005) for further details.
Plan to a particular country, which may be correlated with that country's economic prospects (Kovrijnykh & Szentes, 2007) .
This paper contributes to this literature by providing indirect evidence from the firm-level performance of the impact of multilateral debt relief on HIPC countries that is less likely to be contaminated by endogeneity concerns for several reasons. First, it focuses on the announcement of major initiatives that benefited a large set of countries and are unlikely to be motivated by any specific country's economic prospects. Second, it exploits the forward-looking information contained in the variation in stock prices around specific event dates and relies on local variation of stock prices at a daily frequency to identify the effect of debt relief. Therefore, the findings are not driven by any existing information on a country's economic prospects that was available a few days before the announcements. Finally, the use of firm-level data also differentiates among firms with ex ante different exposure to the events to provide a further test that controls for common shocks.
From a methodological standpoint, this paper is closely related to Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) , who also use an event study to estimate the impact of civil conflict on multinational firms operating diamond mines in Angola. In contrast to Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) , this paper concentrates on a completely different question and focuses on multinationals in an indirect manner, using them to gauge the impact of debt relief on local firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an overview of multilateral debt relief to poor countries and presents a chronology of the initiatives that is used to identify the dates of various announcements. Section III describes the methodological approach and data. Section IV presents the results. Section V concludes.
II. Multilateral Debt Relief to Poor Countries

A. A Brief History of Multilateral Debt Relief to Poor Countries
Historically, countries that became part of the group of HIPC had little access to commercial lending and relied instead on official financing in the form of bilateral loans from industrial countries and multilateral loans from institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and various regional development banks. Official loans to these countries gradually increased until the early 1980s, when many started having problems servicing their debts, at the same time as several middle-income countries did. However, whereas middle-income countries that defaulted on their commercial loans were shut out of international capital markets, industrial countries' governments and multilateral institutions reacted to the debt problems of low-income countries by rescheduling payments and extending bilateral and multilateral loans that would allow these countries to avoid defaulting. For this reason, and in contrast to most middle-income countries, low-income countries maintained a positive net resource transfer during the 1980s (Birdsall & Williamson, 2002) .
This additional lending to poor countries was not typically accompanied by growth, resulting in further debt accumulation as a fraction of GDP. By the late 1980s, most low-income countries exhibited symptoms of unsustainable debt levels, with debt-to-export and debt-to-GDP ratios close to 400% and 150%, respectively. At that stage, it became evident that low-income countries were unable to fully serve their official debt and that some form of broad debt forgiveness was required.
Systematic debt relief to poor countries initially took place by bilateral loans to Paris Club creditors under what became known as the Toronto Terms, the Trinidad Terms, the London Terms, and the Naples Terms, all which provided rescheduling under concessional (below-market) interest rates equivalent to a reduction in the net present value of the debt stock of about $30 billion. 4 At the same time, new bilateral flows increasingly started taking the form of grants. As a result, an increasing fraction of the debt of low-income countries was owed to multilateral institutions, and it was apparent that helping these countries achieve debt sustainability required some form of relief from multilateral debt, which had historically being treated as senior to all other claims and repaid in full, even if by rolling over old loans. 5 Multilateral debt relief to poor countries started with the launching of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in September 1996 at the 22nd meeting of the G8 countries in Lyon, France. The goal of this initiative was to reduce the debt burden of eligible countries to levels considered manageable, conditional on satisfactory policy performance, and involved cooperation among multilateral and bilateral creditors. Under the initiative, debtor countries with per capita income under $695 and ratios of net present value of debt to exports above 200% or 250% (depending on country characteristics) would qualify for the program. 6 Qualifying countries with six years of stable macroeconomic conditions under an IMF program would reach a decision point, whereby creditors would arrange a debt relief package, and after no more than three additional years of successful policy implementation, they would reach a completion point, when they would start receiving debt relief. Contrary to initial expectations, only six of the forty countries that were eligible for HIPC relief had reached a decision point in 1999, and only one, Uganda, had reached completion point.
The slow advances of debt relief under the original HIPC initiative, mainly the result of eligibility conditions, led to 4 See Daseking and Powell (1999) . 5 There is no consensus on whether multilateral institutions engage in defensive lending. While some authors argue that this is the case (Bulow & Rogoff, 2005) , others have found no robust evidence of such behavior in the data (Geginat & Kraay, 2007) . 6 The ratio was replaced by 280% of government revenue for very open economies. criticism from international aid groups and African governments that were calling for substantial modifications to the initiative, and a consensus emerged among industrial countries for faster implementation of debt relief. As a result, the leaders of the G7 countries, meeting in Cologne in June 1999, announced a comprehensive review on the HIPC initiative to provide faster, deeper, and broader debt reduction in what became known as the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (E-HIPC). The main changes were a broadening of the eligibility criteria by reducing the debt-to-export ratio to 150%, and shortening the time required to reach the decision point to three years. Moreover, a country reaching a decision point under the enhanced HIPC would immediately receive some debt relief in the form of reduced debt service. Debt stock reductions would take place once the country reached the completion point. The enhanced initiative also put emphasis on a country's commitment to poverty reduction in two ways: first, in addition to a good policy track record, a country had to submit a sustainable poverty-reduction strategy to become eligible, in the form of a poverty-reduction strategy paper (PRSP), written with the participation of nongovernmental organizations, social movements, labor unions, and similar other organizations; second, countries had to commit to use the resources freed by debt relief to achieve the goals set in the PRSP. Because of the broader eligibility criteria and public pressure, sixteen additional countries were approved for a decision point and started receiving debt relief in the year 2000.
The HIPC initiative emphasized the reduction of debt burdens to sustainable levels to help benefit countries fighting poverty, but the view that multilateral debt cancellation was the only possible solution to the problems of HIPC countries became increasingly popular shortly after the announcement of the enhanced version of the initiative. As a result, a broad campaign was launched to convince leaders of industrial countries-those with most voting rights on multilateral institutions-to provide some form of debt forgiveness. This campaign culminated in the announcement of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) at the Gleneagles Summit Meeting of the heads of state and government of G8 countries in July 2005. The goal of this initiative is to further reduce the debts of HIPC countries and help them achieve the Millennium Development Goals set by world leaders in September 2000, during the United Nations Millennium Summit. Although the initiative operates similarly to the HIPC, its main difference is that it contemplates that once a country completes the HIPC process (that is, reaches completion point), all debt it contracted with the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank before 2003-2004 would be forgiven. 7 June 27, 1996 G8 summit in Lyon, France. The proposal of the HIPC initiative was accepted, except the idea of IMF's gold sales to finance debt relief, which Germany strongly opposed. Options for financing are yet to be finalized. September [29] [30] 1996 Annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank. The HIPC initiative is approved by the IMF and the World Bank. Agreement by the G7 nations to increase debt cancellation from 67% (decided in Naples Terms in 1994) to a maximum of 80% is followed by the approval of the initiative. 
B. Multilateral Debt Relief Event Dates
This paper's analysis separately considers two types of multilateral debt relief events: (a) those common to all eligible countries, such as announcements of the different stages of the HIPC initiative and the MDRI (henceforth labeled major initiatives); and (b) those that benefit an individual HIPC country, such as the announcement that a nation has reached a decision or completion point.
The brief historical discussion evidences that major initiatives are typically a matter of lengthy discussions, so a choice has to be made regarding the relevant announcement dates. For all three major initiatives, the announcement process typically entails three stages. During the first stage, there are numerous requests for debt relief that place the discussion of an initiative on the agenda of a G8 summit meeting. In the second stage, which takes place during or shortly before the summit, the finance ministers of the G8 countries agree on the details of the forthcoming initiative. Finally, the heads of state and government of G8 countries formally announce the initiative during the summit meeting, with the exact details of financing, implementation, eligibility, and so on, to be worked out in the coming months and disclosed during the annual meetings of boards of governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The chronology of these stages for the three major multilateral debt relief initiatives is summarized in table 1. (A detailed chronology of the initiatives, including all the discussion meetings, is available in the Table  Appendix.) For each major debt relief initiative, the event dates are selected following a semi-de facto approach by choosing either the day of the G8 finance ministers' meeting or the day of heads of state meeting, depending on which day has the higher amount of news related to the initiative reported by the international press according to Factiva Newsplus. The amount of this news around those days and around the days of the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF is presented in figure 1. It shows that the announcements made following the meetings of the heads of state and government of G8 countries are those that receive the most press coverage. Therefore, the following days are considered benchmark announcement dates for the major initiatives: June 27, 1997, for the original HIPC initiative; June 18, 1999, for the enhanced HIPC;
and July 8, 2005, for the MDRI. (Results considering the September dates will be discussed in the robustness analysis in Appendix A.)
The process for countries reaching decision and completion points under the HIPC initiative also entails various steps, such as the preparation of a debt sustainability analysis and a series of World Bank and IMF discussions of whether a country meets or is progressing toward the conditions for each milestone. However, since most of these discussions are technical and take place within multilateral institutions, I consider as event dates for these country-specific events the day when the board of governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund officially announces that a country reaches any of these milestones, as documented in the Country Report Documents of the HIPC initiative. 8 Figure 2 shows the distribution of multilateral debt relief events, including the announcement of major initiatives as well as decision and completion points for benefited countries. Just a few countries reached decision or completion points between 1996 (the year of the launching of the original HIPC initiative) and 1999, but a clear cluster of countries reached decision point shortly after the announcement of the enhanced HIPC initiative.
III. Methodology and Data
Under the assumption that the stock returns of multinational parent companies operating in HIPC countries respond to events affecting their subsidiaries and that the value of these subsidiaries is not negatively correlated with the economic performance of the host country, 9 a standard event study that quantifies the impact of multilateral debt relief announcements on the stock prices of multinational companies operating in HIPC-eligible countries provides indirect 8 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/index.asp. 9 The correlation between the growth in market value of parent companies and the average growth of countries where there are subsidiaries is in fact positive and significant (0.16, significant at the 1% level). Furthermore, a regression of the annual growth of a firm's market capitalization against the average growth rate of African HIPC countries where it has subsidiaries, controlling for firm fixed effects, yields a coefficient of 3.26, also significant at the 1% level. The sign and significance even survive after adding year fixed effects to the specification in growth rates (coefficient of 2.57, significant at 5%). These results are not reported but are available on request.
Figure 1.-Distribution of News Related to Major Debt Relief Announcements
The different panels exhibit the number of press articles on the various multilateral debt relief announcements during the days around the G7 (G8) summit meetings where the initiatives were launched and around the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF where the details of implementation where released. The exact days of announcements are shown by the vertical lines (June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 ). evidence of the overall impact of multilateral debt relief on the economic prospects of receiving countries. This paper implements such a study focusing on the stock prices of South African multinationals operating in African HIPC-eligible countries and testing the hypothesis that these announcements convey positive news for these companies. To this end, the parameters of the following augmented two-factor return model are estimated by OLS:
where R i,t is the stock return of company i between trading days t−1 and t; R M t and R I i,t are the market return and the return of company i's industry during the same period, respectively; S l i,t is a dummy variable that controls for the impact of corporate events and takes the value 1 if corporate event type l affected company i on day t. The variable D τ,t is an event time dummy that indicates whether a multilateral debt relief event benefiting a subsidiary of a parent company i occurs at time t. It takes the value 1 when t equals τ and 0 otherwise. The time index τ takes values between t 1 (greater than t 0 ) and t 2 , the beginning and end of the event window in calendar time. The variable i,t is an error term correlated across firms on a given day but assumed independent across days. The parameters α, β, γ, θ, and δ are coefficients to be estimated. The coefficients of interest are the δ τ associated with the event time dummies, which capture the average abnormal return across companies for each day of the event window. The abnormal returns for each firm during the event and estimation windows correspond to the difference between the actual returns and those predicted by the return model (1):
Under the hypothesis that the event under study has a positive impact on parent companies' returns, the δ τ coefficients should be significantly positive around or immediately after 1268 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
-Distribution of HIPC Event Dates by Country
The markers in the figure show the dates of announcements of decision and completion points for African HIPC-eligible countries with investment from South African multinationals, as well as the announcements of the three major debt relief initiatives (HIPC, enhanced HIPC, and MDRI). The dates of the events affecting each of the countries listed in the y-axis are represented by the markers that appear in the row corresponding to each country. Decision and completion points under the original HIPC initiative are represented by + and •, while × and • represent, respectively, decision and completion points under the enhanced HIPC initiative. Vertical lines correspond to the announcements of the three major initiatives. The solid lines correspond to the dates of the G7 (G8) summit announcements and the dashed lines to the final endorsement dates. the event date, and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), defined as
should be significantly increasing during the event window. The event study literature typically privileges the analysis of the CAR when there is uncertainty about the exact date of the event; this convention is followed in the rest of the paper. Another advantage is that the cumulative impact of the events is easier to visualize. 10 The econometric model described in equation (1) directly deals with the clustering of the events under consideration in calendar time (and the potential cross-firm correlation of returns) by allowing the error term i,t to have a calendar time component, exploiting the large number of clusters (calendar days) in the data to obtain asymptotically correct inference. Nevertheless, the standard errors of the average abnormal returns are also estimated using the alternative portfolio approach that exploits only their time series variation over the estimation window (Brown & Warner, 1985) and is akin to the estimator suggested by Donald and Lang (2007) for clustered panel data. Other than correcting for this clustering and for potential heteroskedasticity, all parameters across the paper are estimated by OLS.
In the benchmark results, the parameters of the model are obtained using estimation and event windows of 180 and 15 calendar days before each event, roughly corresponding to 112 and 10 market trading days, respectively, and using lumped returns, 11 but results for different estimation windows, event windows, and using trade-to-trade returns to control for thin trading were also computed as robustness checks. Furthermore, the results were also checked computing the abnormal returns using the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) that replaces the industry-level return R I i,t with the differential return between small and large companies and the differential return of high versus low book-to-market companies (the so-called SMB and HML risk factors).
Nonparametric tests of the hypothesis that the announcements have a positive impact on parent company return have better power when abnormal returns are not normally distributed, as may be the case when trading is infrequent, also called thin-trading (Corrado, 1989; Campbell & Wasley, 1996) . Two nonparametric tests frequently used in the literature are the Corrado (1989) rank test, and the Cowan (1992) generalized sign test. The Corrado rank test is based on the following statistic T t :
where 0.5 × (t 2 − t 0 + 1) is the expected value of the rank. The numeratorK t is the mean rank deviation of abnormal returns at event time t, and σ(K) is the standard deviation of this mean. Under the assumption that abnormal returns are independent across time, this statistic follows a standard normal distribution, and the hypothesis that the median rank deviation of the abnormal returns at a given time τ,K τ , is statistically different from 0 can be tested by applying standard normal critical values to the statistic T τ . 12 In addition to reporting the mean rank deviations and their significance, the figures that follow will show the cumulative mean rank deviation computed by adding the mean rank deviations during the event window and whose standard deviation is obtained under the assumption that mean rank deviations are i.i.d. (Campbell and Wasley, 1996) . 13 The Cowan (1992) generalized sign test follows a similar logic as the rank test, but focuses instead on the mean sign deviations of the abnormal returnsḠ t to build a normally distributed statistic S t as
where N and N t are the total number of firms and the number of firms active at time t, respectively; M i is the number of nonmissing returns of firm i during the estimation period; 12 The results reported below follow the modification of Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2009) modification to the Corrado (1989) test to allow for missing returns. 13 Inference based on the i.i.d. assumption may fail because at the firm level, ranks are serially dependent by construction. A recent literature has built some tests that address this issue (Kolari & Pynnonen, 2008) . However, the serial correlation at the individual level does not need to translate in serial correlation for the average ranks. In fact, in the results reported below, the serial correlation of average ranks is negligible, and the hypothesis of serial independence cannot be rejected at conventional levels, so the multiday tests based on serial independence (such as those for the cumulative mean rank deviations) have only a small bias. Moreover, this potential problem does not apply to the single day tests reported below or to the sign statistics discussed next.p is the empirical probability of a nonnegative abnormal return; and σ(Ḡ) is the standard deviation of the meanḠ t , which should be 0 under the null hypothesis that the event has no impact on returns. This statistic is less sensitive than Corrado's rank test to changes in variance within the event window and to thin trading (Cowan, 1992) and complements the evidence obtained from the former. The cumulative mean sign deviations and their standard deviations reported in various figures are computed in the same manner as the cumulative mean rank deviations.
Three aspects of the empirical strategy deserve further discussion. First, the impact that an event on a subsidiary has on the value of its parent company depends on the fraction of the parent's value represented by the subsidiary. If the subsidiary is small relative to the parent, even a large change in its value will result in a small change in the parent's returns that may be hard to separate from normal return fluctuations using statistical procedures. This means that tests based on the response of parents' returns could have low power, which would tend to bias the results against finding a significant abnormal return as a result of the events under consideration. This is precisely the reason for this paper's focus on South African multinationals with operations in HIPC countries, which are smaller than other multinationals operating in these countries. For instance, the median assets of South African multinationals operating in Ghana were about $8 billion in 2006. In contrast, the largest multinationals operating in Ghana in various industries are Royal Dutch Shell, Barclays, and Nestle, all with hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. Although data on the value of assets of subsidiaries are typically unavailable, total employment in HIPC countries is about 7% of the employment in South African parent companies on average (median of 3%). Thus, these subsidiaries are about one order of magnitude smaller than their parents but not negligible (see table 2 ). Furthermore, the reduced power of standard estimation can be significantly improved by complementing the standard results of the nonparametric tests. Second, event studies rely on the efficient market assumption that news that has an impact on the value of the firm is quickly incorporated in stock prices. This assumption requires transparent and liquid stock markets. While the JSE is smaller in absolute terms and more illiquid than stock markets in developed countries, it is one of the largest emerging stock markets, with a market capitalization of 1.6 times its GDPmuch larger than that of countries like the United States, and also one of the most liquid, with a market turnover value similar to that of Singapore. Moreover, South Africa fares well among emerging markets in terms of investor rights and corporate governance indexes, with a creditor rights index of 3 out of 4 according to Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and an active program to improve corporate governance. Finally, from a more technical perspective, all the tests discussed rely on asymptotic distributions of the statistics, so they require a large number of event firms to be valid. This should not be a problem when pooling all events together, but may become relevant when trying to disentangle the impact 1270 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS (2006), which reports all South African companies with operations in other African countries at the end of 2006. This publication enumerates the subsidiaries and operations of each South African multinational and reports partial information on the date of initial investment, holdings, and number of employees in each subsidiary. From it, all firms listed in the JSE, and with operations or subsidiaries in African HIPC-eligible countries during the period of the initiatives (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) were selected, to obtain a sample of 35 companies with 187 subsidiaries in eighteen countries. This information was complemented by and checked with data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1993, 2004) , Graham and Whiteside (1997-2004) , Lexis-Nexis (2007), business press reports relating parent and subsidiaries in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva-Newsplus, and information requests sent directly to South African companies identified as having affiliates in eligible African HIPC countries. 15 The list of the eighteen sub-Saharan African countries 14 A recent literature focuses on methods to produce valid inference in cases with even a single treated firm that rely on the use of bootstrapping to compute small sample statistics. Since the point estimates are not encouraging for the case in which small samples may be an issue (the original HIPC), this approach is not further pursued in this paper. 15 A letter was sent to each parent company with missing information requesting data on initial investment date and size of subsidiaries, reaching a response rate of about 30%. that have been eligible for different stages of the HIPC and MDRI, the number of parent companies with subsidiaries in each of these countries, the median assets of these parent companies, and the average number of subsidiaries per parent in each of these countries are reported in table 2. The four countries with the largest number of parent companies investing are Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Tanzania. For instance, 24 of the 35 parent companies have subsidiaries in Zambia. However, this does not mean that Zambia could drive all results since there are only 4 parent companies that invest only in this country. The parent companies have median assets of $2 billion, but these vary substantially across countries. There is a negative correlation between the number of parent companies and the median values, since only the largest multinationals have operations in smaller and poorer countries. On average, each of the parents has about 5.34 subsidiaries per country.
The date of initial investment in subsidiaries located in African HIPC countries reveals whether a parent company is affected by a specific debt relief event. For instance, only companies with active subsidiaries in African HIPC-eligible countries in June 1996 are considered as affected by the original HIPC initiative announcement. Table 3 lists the parent companies with investments in African countries that have been eligible for multilateral debt relief since 1996, the number of their subsidiaries in African HIPC countries, total employment in these subsidiaries, and the ratio of this total employment to that of the parent company for each of the three years with an announcement of a major initiative (1996, 1999, and 2005) . The last three columns show the median size of the parents' assets and sales at the end of 2006, and the main industry of the parent company, respectively. The three bottom rows of the table display the average of each measure across companies for each announcement year, across all years (labeled "Overall"), and the medians across all years, respectively. Both assets and sales of parents are about $2 billion, and the average parent company has about four subsidiaries. Parent companies with interests in HIPC countries are also homogeneously distributed across industries (column 12). Utilities are the only industry where no South African company has affiliates in other African HIPC countries. 16 Stock returns and corporate-event data for the selected parent companies were obtained from Bloomberg. The market return is based on the JSE All Shares Index, and the industry return associated to each parent is that of the FT JSE Index of the industry of the primary activity of the parent company, both also obtained from Bloomberg. The fraction of parent companies with available return data increased during the period, but even in 1996, there are return data available for more than 70% of the firms. Corporate event data included in S l i,t comprise the following corporate action types: capital 
(3)
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Employ. The table reports summary statistics for each parent company in each of the years of a major announcement of a debt relief intiative. Columns 1, 4, and 7 report the number of subsidiaries in African HIPC countries in 1996, 1999, and 2005, respectively. Columns 2, 5, and 8 report the total employment in these subsidiaries, adjusted for the holdings of the parent company, for the same three years. The adjustment is such that if the subsidiary is fully owned, all employment is counted, but if it is partly owned, the number of employees imputed are the total in the subsidiary times the fraction owned by the parent. Columns 3, 6, and 9 present the ratio of total employment in African HIPC countries to total parent employment. Columns 10 and 11 report total assets and annual sales of the parent companies from the latest available of the 2005 Columns labeled CAR report the cumulative abnormal returns of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading day within a ten-day event window. CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Standard errors correct for the clustering of the events in calendar time. Column 1 reports results obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and columns 2 to 4 separately present similar results for the HIPC initiative, the enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summits held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 . "Number of firms" reports the number of companies over which abnormal returns are computed in each occasion. * * * , * * , and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. changes, corporate events, and distributions, all as defined by Bloomberg. 17
Assets
IV. Results
This section presents the results of the event study analysis of the impact of multilateral debt relief announcements. It first describes the results obtained for the major debt relief initiatives, followed by those obtained for countrylevel debt relief announcements (decision and completion points). Results from parametric and nonparametric tests and robustness analysis are discussed in each case.
A. Major Debt Relief Initiatives
The evolution of the estimated cumulative abnormal return CAR τ for the three major debt relief initiatives, in an event window of ten trading days around the event date is reported in table 4 and depicted in the various panels of figure 3, along their 90%, confidence bands. Figure 3A shows the CAR obtained by pooling the three major initiatives, and Figures 3B to 3D display the CAR separately estimated for the HIPC initiative, enhanced HIPC initiative, and MDRI, respectively.
The announcement of a major debt relief initiative is associated with a statistically significant increase in the CAR of about 1 percentage point ( figure 3A) . While cumulative abnormal returns are 10 basis points three days before the announcement, they increase to 140 basis points one day after the announcement (column 1 of table 4). This threeday increase is equivalent to more than 200% on an annual basis. Considering that parent companies are large relative to their subsidiaries, this increase is economically significant and suggests a much larger increase in the underlying value of the affiliates. For instance, if a parent company's operations in all HIPC countries represent 10% of its overall value (roughly the average ratio of subsidiary to parent employment in the data), a 1% increase in the value of the parent company is consistent with a 10% increase in the value of those operations. 18 The results therefore indicate that the announcement of major debt relief initiatives conveys positive news for South African multinational companies with affiliates in eligible African HIPC countries that translate to an abnormal increase in their share returns. Figures 3B to 3D show heterogeneity in the response to the different major debt relief initiatives. The announcement of the original HIPC initiative does not have a significant impact on the returns of parent companies ( figure 3B ). While these companies had significantly positive abnormal returns at the beginning of the event window (two weeks before the event), there is no upward break in the CAR around in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. A: the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together. B-D: evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 the event date. Moreover, the positive CAR at the beginning of the event window cannot be attributed to the meeting of the finance minsters of G7 countries because on this occasion, the meeting took place simultaneously with the summit. Apparently financial markets did not perceive this announcement as affecting the valuation of parent companies with ongoing operations in HIPC-eligible countries. However, this evidence has to be taken with caution because there were ten South African parent companies with activities in HIPC countries in 1996 in the data. The announcement of the enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI resulted in an increase in cumulative abnormal returns of about two percentage points (figures 3C and 3D), although the increase was consistently significant at conventional levels only for the MDRI. The CAR increased from −30 basis points three days before the announcement of the enhanced HIPC to 150 basis points the day of the announcement, although it started declining consistently and losing statistical significance two days later. Thus, the impact on stock prices, while significant and economically meaningful, seems to have been short lived. In the case of the MDRI, the CAR rose from −20 basis points three days before the event to 140 basis points the day after it, and climbed to 200 basis points ten days after the announcement of the initiative, also remaining statistically significant throughout the window. These results support the hypothesis that markets considered the latest MDRI, and to a lesser extent the enhanced HIPC initiative, as significantly positive news for parent companies with operations in eligible countries. The conclusions about the impact of major debt relief initiatives on the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns are robust to changes in the length of the estimation and event windows, as well as changes in the sample of parent companies (see Appendix A).
In addition to being economically meaningful in terms of abnormal returns, the announcements resulted in increases in firm value that were nontrivial but commensurate with the amount of debt relief provided. For instance, the average parent firm in the sample during the MDRI announcement had a market capitalization of about $3 billion and a cumulative abnormal return of about 2%, which translates to a $2 billion value increase when considering the thirty-five firms in the sample. This figure is economically meaningful and, being 1274 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. A: the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together. B-D: the evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 one order of magnitude smaller than the $50 billion estimated amount of debt relief provided, is consistent with these parent companies' capturing a fraction of the benefits of debt relief.
The inference in the baseline results was conducted using a regression approach to cluster the standard errors of the average abnormal returns at the calendar level. This is an appropriate procedure when the number of clusters is large, as is the case in this paper (about 130 calendar days), but in the event study literature, it is also common to deal with the clustering of events by using only the time series variation of abnormal returns to compute their standard errors (Brown and Warner, 1985) . This is also akin to the estimator proposed by Donald and Lang (2007) for inference with clustered data. The results reported in figure 4 show that the main findings are robust to using this approach for computing the standard errors of the CAR. While the confidence bands are wider, especially when considering individual events, figures 3A and 3D show that the CAR are still significant at the 10% level for the pooling of all major initiatives and for MDRI, respectively. The most affected result is the significance of the CAR after the enhanced HIPC, which is notoriously reduced and is not significant at conventional levels. 19 The baseline results were derived using an augmented two-factor return model that controls for market and industry risk factors. This choice of return model is not crucial for the results, and very similar but statistically stronger conclusions are reached when using the three-factor return model introduced by Fama and French (1993) or when computing the abnormal returns of a parent company as the difference between its returns and those of the rest of the South African firms in the same size and book-to-market groups (not reported).
Although the JSE is now a liquid emerging stock market, it was considerably smaller and less liquid in 1996, just 19 The point estimates for the CAR may slightly differ from those in the baseline estimation because the estimation windows of some firms with few observations were extended for the estimation of the firm-level return model. The standard errors reported were obtained using only the time series variation of the abnormal returns, as indicated in Brown & Warner (1985) , but including only days in the estimation window where the number of traded firms was equal to the median number of firms present during the event window, as a crude adjustment for the illiquidity of some stocks. Average days 1-2 8.9 * * * 1.6 7.1 11.8 * * 8.8 * * * 0.4 3.3 * * 5.2 * * * Average days 1-5 4.3 * * 1.4 2.7 5.9 * 4.4 * * 0.5 1.7 2.3 * Panel A: each column reports the mean rank deviations of abnormal returns during a 10-trading day window around the announcement of major debt relief initiatives and indicators of the significance of the test that each of those differences is equal to 0. Panel B: reports the mean sign deviations for the generalized sign test. Mean rank and sign deviations were computed based on abnormal returns estimated over an estimation window of 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-day event window. Event dates considered for the HIPC initiative, the enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI correspond to the G8 summits held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 , respectively. * * * , * * , and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. a few years after the end of the apartheid and international and domestic restrictions to capital flows. This means that thin-trading and the resulting volatility and nonnormality of returns may be a problem in earlier years, although the listing of smaller companies in later years may also result in the presence of illiquid stocks in the final part of the sample. Nevertheless, the positive impact of major debt relief announcements indicated by the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns is supported by the results of nonparametric rank and sign tests with better power under nonnormal returns than standard parametric tests. 20 The evolution of the mean rank deviationsK t during each day of the event window is reported in columns 1 to 4 of table 5 for all major initiatives, HIPC, enhanced HIPC, and MDRI, respectively. Similar to the parametric tests based on the CAR, the mean rank deviations take a positive and statistically significant value the day after the event when looking at the pooling of all major initiatives (column 1) and at the MDRI (column 4). Furthermore, in these two cases, there is no other positive significant rank deviation within the event window. This time coincidence further supports the association of these abnormally high returns and the event under consideration. This is corroborated by 20 The results are also supported by evidence from CAR obtained from estimating equation (1) using trade-to-trade returns (returns computed over two consecutive days of trading, not over two consecutive calendar days), an alternative and popular manner of dealing with thin trading first suggested by Maynes and Rumsey (1993) (not reported). multiday tests reported at the bottom of the table that test the hypothesis that the average mean rank deviation at different horizons is different from 0 when considering the first two and five days after the event. The magnitude of the rank deviations, between 11 and 18, is also economically significant. It indicates that the ranks of the abnormal returns in those dates are at least ten places higher than what would be expected by chance, which corresponds to 20% of the expected rank value. 21 These changes in the rank of abnormal returns are clearly displayed in figure 5 , which exhibits the cumulative mean rank deviations during the event window and their 90% confidence bands. In all cases but the original HIPC initiative, there is a positive break in the cumulative values around the event day, although the cumulative statistics are statistically significant only for the pool of major initiatives ( figure 5A ) and for the MDRI ( figure 5D ).
Stronger results are obtained for the median sign deviations G τ , whose evolution within the event window is reported in columns 5 to 8 of table 5 and depicted in figure 6 in cumulative form, and which is more robust to thin trading than the rank test (Cowan, 1992) . Except for the original HIPC initiative, the results exhibit positive and significant statistics in a window of two days around the event date. After the announcement, abnormal returns are much more likely to be positive than expected by chance. For instance, there are 1276 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Figure 5 .
-Evolution of Cumulative Median Rank Deviations of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of the cumulative mean rank deviations of abnormal returns (CAR) of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days, and the same windows are used to determine the ranks. A: the median rank deviations of the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together. B-D: the evolution of the median rank deviations separately estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 on average 10 more firms with positive abnormal returns the day after the announcement of a major initiative (out of 68) and 8 firms more after the announcement of MDRI (out of 35). This is confirmed by the multiday tests reported at the bottom of the table that show that the average median sign deviations remain significant several days after the event date and confirmed as well in figure 6 , which shows that cumulative mean sign deviations are statistically significant after the event day for the pooling of all events, for the MDRI, and marginally so for the enhanced HIPC. As in the case of parametric tests, these findings are robust to variations in the estimation windows (not reported).
The lack of significant results for the original HIPC initiative using nonparametric tests with better power than parametric tests under nonnormality, as shown by Corrado (1989) and Cowan (1992) , makes unlikely that the lack of impact of the original HIPC on parent companies' returns stems from the illiquidity of the JSE during this period or the small number of firms, and supports instead the view that the original initiative did not have a noticeable impact on these parent companies indirectly affected. One could conjecture that this lack of impact could arise from the requirements that eligible countries had to meet under the original HIPC initiative to begin receiving some form of relief, which the markets could have anticipated were not going to be met by a broad set of countries, although, of course, this remains to be proven.
The baseline results reported above consider as event dates the announcements of debt relief initiative taking place in the summit meetings of heads of state and government of the G8. Nevertheless, as discussed in section II, the details of the initiatives, including the eligibility criteria, were typically sorted out during the annual meetings of the board of governors of the World Bank and IMF taking place in September of the same year. It is therefore possible that some valuable information affecting the returns of companies with interests in HIPC countries could be released around these dates instead.
To check for this possibility, the evolution of the CAR was also estimated around the dates of the World Bank and IMF annual meetings reported in table 1. The results, presented in Figure 6 .
-Evolution of Cumulative Median Sign Deviations of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of the cumulative mean sign deviations of abnormal returns (CAR) of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. A: the median sign deviations of the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together. B-D: the evolution of the median sign deviations separately estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 figure 7, do not show clear evidence of a break in the pattern of abnormal returns around these alternative event dates, except in the case of the enhanced HIPC initiative. When pooling all major initiatives together, as well as when looking at the MDRI, there is no significant impact on the sequence of CAR around the dates of the annual meetings. The results, therefore, tend to indicate that the announcements of the launching of the various initiatives by the heads of state of industrial countries are the ones that are considered good news for firms with operations in HIPC countries by financial markets, suggesting that for the most part, financial markets assume that once those announcements are made, the details of the implementation are of second-order importance.
Overall the results consistently show that the announcement of major debt relief initiatives had on average a positive impact on the stock market returns of parent companies with ongoing operations in benefited countries. When looking at individual announcements, there is also strong evidence of an abnormally positive stock price response following the announcement of the MDRI and no evidence of a positive impact after the launching of the initial HIPC in 1996. The evidence on the consequences of the announcement of the enhanced version of the HIPC in 1999 is less clear. The point estimates for CAR and nonparametric statistics show an initial stock price response that is similar to that following the MDRI but much shorter lived, and the statistical significance of this initial response varies across tests from marginally significant to not significant at all. This lack of robust inference may be due to the relatively small number of firms affected by this event (23) and the high volatility of the JSE during this year (the JSE all share index was much more volatile in 1999 than in 1996 despite the larger number of listed firms). According to this interpretation, from a statistical perspective, this episode would be better considered as part of the pool of major debt relief initiatives than in isolation. However, the comparison of the stark results for the MDRI and the weaker enhanced HIPC results also suggests the possibility that there was something different about the episodes. It could be that the announcement of the MDRI was a sharper event, in that it was more immediately clear what the implications 1278 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. A: the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together. B-D: the evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the final agreements on implementation of the initatives during the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on September 29, 1996 , September 26, 1999 , and September 26, 2005 were for individual countries, while it may have taken more time for these implications to be clear in HIPC and enhanced HIPC cases, blurring the results for these events.
B. Country-Level Announcements
The impact of the announcements of major debt relief initiatives on parent companies with operations in HIPC-eligible countries indicates that markets believe these countries will eventually get debt relief. However, at the time of these announcements, there was still uncertainty about whether and when a specific country will meet the conditions for HIPC and MDRI relief. This uncertainty resolves as countries advance through the HIPC process and reach decision and completion points. So the formal announcement that a country has reached one of these milestones could in principle affect the returns of a related parent company. The following results test for this possibility.
The estimated sequences of cumulative abnormal returns for decision and completion point events during a ten-trading-day event window, along with their 90% confidence bands, are depicted in figure 8. Figures 8A and 8B show no significantly positive CAR around the event dates for decision or completion points. However, in both cases, the CAR exhibits a preevent decreasing trend that stops and slightly reverses around the announcement dates and could indicate some market response to the announcements. Looking separately at decision and completion points reached under the HIPC and enhanced HIPC does not significantly affect the results (not reported). In sum, parametric tests offer little support to the hypothesis that the resolution of the uncertainty about a country getting debt relief has an impact on the stock returns of parent companies with affiliates in that country.
Nonparametric tests, however, are more supportive of the hypothesis that these country-level announcements have some effect on stock returns. The estimated mean rank deviations and mean sign deviations of the rank and sign tests statistics for decision and completion points are reported in table 6. Both tests produce positive and statistically significant statistics immediately after the announcement of a completion point (between dates 0 and 2; see columns 2 and 4), with average statistics that are still significant at conventional levels five days after the event. Since these tests are better able to deal with nonnormality, they provide more robust evidence than parametric tests based on the estimated CAR. The magnitude of the increase in abnormal returns is small, however, reaching a maximum cumulative value of 40 basis points five days after the event (relative to its preevent level).
In summary, the evidence cannot fully reject the hypothesis that the announcement of a completion point has some positive impact on the returns of parent companies with affiliates in the benefited country, but the size of the impact is small compared with that of major initiatives. This is not surprising considering that country-level announcements affect parent companies only through their operations in that individual country, while major initiatives affect them through their operations in all eligible countries. It seems that the breadth of the impact of major initiatives compensates for the remaining uncertainty about the timing of debt relief to specific countries to induce movements in the returns of parent companies.
C. Does the Intensity of Exposure Matter?
The baseline results are based on identifying abnormal returns of parent companies with operations in HIPC countries controlling for market and industry movements but do not exploit variation in their exposure to the events. Any two South African multinationals with operations in an HIPC country at the time of an announcement are considered exposed to the event regardless the size of their operations. However, to the extent that the abnormal returns already documented result from an improvement in the prospects of exposed companies, one would expect parent companies Each column reports the sequence of mean rank deviations of abnormal returns of South African multinational companies with affiliates in benefited HIPC countries during a 10-trading-day window around each decision and completion point events, as well as indicators of the significance of the test that each of those differences is equal to 0. Mean rank deviations were computed based on abnormal returns estimated over a window of 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-day event window. * * * , * * , and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. with larger interests in HIPC-eligible countries to benefit relatively more from the events. Therefore, differences in the intensity of exposure to the event can be used to build an additional test of the hypothesis that the stock price response to 1280 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the announcements comes from their significance for firms' prospects and to provide further support to the mechanism behind the results.
To build this test, I construct a measure of the exposure of a parent company to an HIPC event by computing the ratio of the total employment of its affected affiliates (adjusted for parent company holdings) to the parent's total number of employees. The focus on employment as a size measure instead of assets is for data availability reasons; while data on a parent company's assets are easy to obtain, most subsidiaries report employment data only to McGregor (2006) . Employment data for those subsidiaries with some available information are typically obtainable only for 2005-2006, so subsidiary employment is considered a fixed subsidiary characteristic and is normalized by parent total employment data for the year of each event. Based on these data, a parent's company exposure to an announcement at time t is computed as the ratio of the total employment of all its subsidiaries operating in benefited countries at that moment, to the parent's total employment. 22 Recognizing that this measure is likely to contain an important amount of noise because of the assumptions required to extend the sample coverage, the final measure does not exploit the continuous nature of this exposure indicator but instead classifies parent companies in two groups depending on whether its exposure indicator is above or below the median level, and compare the behavior of the abnormal returns across these two groups. 23 The evolution of the CAR for parent companies with relatively high and low exposure is reported in figure 9 . Figure 9C reports the evolution of the differential effect of the exposure on these CARs and their 90% confidence bands. The response of CAR in parent companies with relatively higher exposure to the events is clearly larger than that of less exposed companies (see figures 9A and 9B). Moreover, this difference is significantly different from 0 at conventional levels immediately after the event. As shown in figure 9C , which exhibits the evolution of the difference in CAR for firms with relatively high exposure, the CAR of these firms increases clearly more than that of firms with low exposure.
The results reported in this section show that returns of multinational firms with relatively larger interests in countries benefited by multilateral debt relief increase relatively more after the announcements of these initiatives. This finding provides strong support to the hypothesis that the abnormal returns for parent companies exposed to debt relief events in the baseline estimates are a consequence of the market's assessment that the events convey positive news for the value of these companies. Results in the next section explore the reasons behind these assessments.
D. Aggregate Demand versus Future Taxation
Debt relief can increase the value of firms with operations in benefited countries by reducing their expected future taxation or raising their gross profits as a consequence of the increase in demand resulting from an increase in its own or in aggregate investment. This section presents results aimed to disentangle which of these channels is most likely to be responsible for the stock return response of parent companies. To this end, it separately looks at the impact of the announcements of major initiatives on the returns of parent companies operating in industries that are likely to have different sensitivities to local taxation and aggregate demand.
Resource extraction is typically considered an enclave industry, whose rents are readily taxed or even expropriated, especially if they are foreign owned (Engel & Fischer, 2010) and whose investment and production is sensitive to ownership risk (Bohn & Deacon, 2000) . Also, resource extraction produces commodities sold in global markets, so gross profits in this industry depend little on the growth of aggregate demand in the host country. Thus, it can be expected that this industry would benefit relatively more by a reduction in expected future taxes than by an improvement in the host country's future economic conditions. On the contrary, the performance of firms in nontradable service industries depends mainly on local economic conditions, and at the same time, for political economy reasons, these industries may be a less tempting target for taxes because they tend to be more labor intensive. Therefore, the differential response of stock returns of parent companies operating in resource extraction versus companies operating in services can be used to test whether the positive stock market return of major announcements comes mainly from the market's assessment of an expansion of aggregate demand on the benefited countries or from a reduction in expected taxes paid by parent companies.
The evolution of cumulative abnormal returns and their corresponding 90% confidence bands for companies in resource extraction and service industries, as well as the difference in CAR between these two industries during a ten-day window around the announcement of major initiatives is reported in figure 10 . The figure shows that the CAR experiences a larger and more significant increase around the event day for parent companies in resource extraction than in services. Although the CAR of resource companies reaches 5 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 10% level since day 0, those of service companies climb up to only 1 percentage point and are statistically significant at 12%. This differential response can be clearly seen in Figure  10C , which shows that the CAR of companies in resource industries is higher than those of companies in service industries, and that this difference is significantly different from 0 in various postevent dates (days 3, 7, and 8).
Thus, while the CAR of firms in nontradable industries increases after a major announcement, that of resource industries increases significantly more. Under the assumption that Figures in each panel display the evolution of CARs of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996; June 18, 1999; and July 8, 2005. stock prices of companies in resource extraction industries are relatively more responsive to expected taxation than those of companies in the service sector and that the opposite is true for the responsiveness to local economic prospects, the stronger positive stock returns' response of the former relative to the latter suggests that the expected reduction in future taxation after a major debt relief announcement has a larger impact on stock market prices than expected increases in aggregate demand.
Although an expected tax reduction could be a pure transfer to shareholders without any benefit for the countries receiving debt relief, as would be the case if public and private investment was not immediately constrained by high expected future taxes but for other factors (such as institutions, see Arslanalp & Henry, 2006) , there is some anecdotal evidence that this is not the case. First, subsidiaries in sectors that are more sensitive to local conditions also experience an increase in value. Service firms are also subject to taxation, so part of the increase must also be driven by lower expected taxes, but among service industries, firms in noncyclical services (food retailers and telecommunications) that are likely more closely related to local economic conditions than other service firms experienced the largest increase (about 3% CAR, significant at the 5% level). This seems to indicate some expected increase in aggregate demand but has to be taken with caution because there are only five event firms in this sector. Second, private FDI inflows to African HIPC countries increased on average from 3.9% to 5.8% of GDP between 2004 and 2006 (the year before and after the MDRI), while the increase for non-HIPC African countries was from 3.5 to 1282 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Figure 10 .
-Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives: Firms in Resource Extraction versus Firms in Services
Figures in each panel display the evolution of CARs of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading day within a 10-day event window around the date of the announcements (solid lines) and their 90% confidence intervals (broken lines). Each CAR is based on abnormal returns estimated from a two-factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. A: the CAR of parent companies in resource extraction industries; B: the CAR of parent companies in the service sector. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 4.1 of GDP during the same period, suggesting that more resources have been devoted to these countries by international investors. 24 Furthermore, as shown in table 3, the number of subsidiaries of South African multinationals in African HIPC countries also increased during this period, and a more detailed comparison of the dates of new investments reported in McGregor (2006) shows that the average annual number of new South African subsidiaries per country in African HIPC countries experienced a statistically significant increase of 0. 24 between 1990-1995 and 1996-2006 (from 0.31 to 0.55). Among non-HIPC African countries, the increase was a nonsignificant 0.15 (from 0.89 to 1.04). 25 24 This is not only due to a decline in GDP since the inflows in levels also duplicated from an average of $172 to $366 million during the same period (World Bank, 2009) . 25 The average number of new subsidiaries per country is the number of new subsidiaries created or acquired in a given year divided by the number of countries. The number reported is the average of these ratios across two time periods: pre- HIPC, 1990 -1995 and post-HIPC, 1996 While not conclusive, this anecdotal evidence suggests that investment and economic activity may have been constrained by debt overhang and that the decline in expected taxes is unlikely to be a pure transfer to the shareholders of multinationals.
Finally, the evidence in figure 10 also helps to dispel the possibility that the abnormal returns could come from firms in nontradable industries benefiting from a real appreciation resulting from the increase in net aid inflows associated with debt relief (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005a , 2005b . If this mechanism were driving the results, the resource-producing industries, which are tradable, should experience a smaller abnormal stock price response than nontradable industries, exactly the opposite of what is found in the data. eighteen sub-Saharan African HIPC countries, and the eleven non-HIPC countries where South African companies have any investment according to McGregor (2006) .
V. Conclusion
There has been considerable attention in recent years to the debt problems of poor countries and numerous calls for debt relief coming from all sectors of society and from actors ranging from the religious leaders to rock stars. These calls have been based on arguments ranging from the moral wrong of rich countries' collecting debt from people at the brink of starvation to the economic costs of debt overhang, and have encompassed issues such as the fight against poverty and the irrationality of permanently rolling over multilateral loans. This paper has focused on the economic rationale for debt relief and looked for evidence that multilateral debt relief initiatives improve the economic prospects of benefited countries. In contrast to the existing literature, this is done by conducting an event study to overcome the standard econometric problems of estimating aggregate relations between debt relief and macroeconomic performance.
The evidence presented in the paper overwhelmingly indicates that the announcement of multilateral debt relief initiatives conveys good news for multinational firms operating in receiving countries according to the views of financial market. The stock return of firms with affiliates in these countries experiences a statistically and economically significant abnormal increase around the dates of the formal announcements of the initiatives, especially after the launching of the MDRI. This increase is larger for firms with relatively larger interests in receiving countries and seems to come mainly from the perception that future taxes will be lower as a result of debt relief. This indirect evidence is consistent with the debt overhang argument for debt relief, where the expectation of future taxation depresses the value of future investment projects, and it suggests that the announcements of the initiatives were perceived as potentially beneficial for the receiving countries.
As in any other empirical exercise, there are caveats to keep in mind despite the strength of the evidence. First, the results directly show that multinationals operating in benefited countries benefit most likely because their subsidiaries benefit. The interpretation that the countries receiving debt relief also benefit relies on the increases in parent companies' values resulting from an improvement in the host countries' economic prospects. This can plausibly result from an expected increase in public and private investments resulting from lower expected taxes that rises with aggregate demand and productivity or from an expansion in net resource transfers. There are other channels, however, for the value of multinational to increase without an improvement in host countries' economic prospects. One is that the value of the firms under study behaved countercyclically. If that were the case, an improvement in the value of multinationals may signal a decline in expected local conditions, but this is not the case for the firms in this sample. A second possibility, discussed in section IVD, is that debt relief may simply be a transfer from creditors to the shareholders of these multinational firms without any benefit for the country receiving relief. Absent direct transfers, this would most likely occur through lower taxation, as shown in the previous section, which is the type of improvement in the business environment behind the debt overhang argument. It still may be the case that investment may not be constrained by debt overhang but by poor institutions, as discussed in Arslanalp & Henry (2006) , and the decline in taxation may lead not to further investment but just higher dividends for shareholders. However, the scarce available anecdotal evidence points toward expansions in foreign direct investment inflows in African HIPC countries relative to other African countries around the launching of the MDRI and the broader HIPC initiative, consistent with the debt overhang argument. Without constituting a formal proof, this suggests that incentives to invest in benefited countries improved, which is probably partly responsible for the increase in stock prices following the announcements, as suggested from limited evidence from noncyclical service firms.
Second, the results in this paper indicate that the benefit is quantitatively meaningful from the point of view of parents and subsidiaries. However, the size of the effect for the receiving country will surely differ from my estimation. The evidence presented here has to be considered highly indicative of the presence of the positive impact of debt relief rather than a quantification of that impact. As is almost always the case, the benefits of the methodological approach in terms of cleaner identification are weighed by the cost of deviating from the immediate object of interest: the aggregate growth effect of these initiatives.
Finally, an event study methodology exploits, by construction, the local variation of the data to identify the consequences of a specific event; everything occurring outside the event windows is considered as potentially contaminated by other developments. This is, of course, an untested identification assumption. It is therefore impossible to know within this framework whether the financial market's view of the consequences of these initiatives persisted in time beyond the windows studied in this paper or reversed as a result of further news.
APPENDIX
Robustness to Changes in the Windows and Samples
The conclusions about the impact of major debt relief initiatives on the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns are robust to changes in the length of the estimation and event windows, as well as changes in the sample of parent companies, as shown in the different panels of figure A1 . Figure A1 summarizes the findings only for the pooling of major debt relief announcements, but similar results are obtained for individual announcements (available upon request). Panel A shows results for different estimation windows, where the bold lines depict the evolution of the baseline estimates of the CAR, obtained with an estimation window of 112 trading days, and the thin lines display the evolution of the CAR for smaller estimation windows ranging from 52 to 102 trading days, in increments of 10. The shaded area corresponds to the envelope of the estimated patterns. It is clear in the figure that the pattern of the CAR does not vary importantly with the reduction of the estimation window and that the range spanned by the different estimates does not deviate importantly from the baseline results. Panel B summarizes the CAR obtained after changing the length of the event window from the baseline level of 10 trading days around the event to 5 and 20 trading days. As before, the pattern and level of CAR are largely unaffected by these changes in length. Panel C shows that the baseline results are also robust to changes in the sample of parent companies by summarizing the distribution of the sequence of CAR obtained after dropping one parent company at a time. At each event time, the figure shows the mean, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, and minimum and maximum CAR estimated for that date, and marks in gray the area spanned between the minimum and maximum estimated CAR. The distribution of the CAR at each event day is tightly concentrated around the mean value, which indicates that the pattern depicted in the baseline results is not driven by any individual parent company.
Figure A1.-Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns under Different Estimation Windows
Figures in each panel display the evolution CARs of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a ten-day event window around the date of the announcements. All figures correspond to the CAR obtaining by pooling all major initiatives together. A: different lines correspond to CAR estimated using estimation windows of different length; the thick line corresponds to the baseline values of the CAR obtained with an estimation window of 112 trading days, and the other lines depict the CAR obtained with shorter estimation windows ranging from 102 to 52 trading days, in intervals of 10. The gray area is the envelope spanned by the different sequences of CAR reported. B: similar results for various event windows around the date of the announcements. The thick line corresponds to the CAR obtained with an event window of 20 trading days around the announcements, the dashed line those for 10 trading days, and the dotted line those for 5 trading days. In all cases, the estimation window is 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-day estimation window plus (minus) the difference corresponding to the varying length of the event window. C: the distribution of CAR at each day in the benchmark 10-day event window obtained after sequentially dropping one of the affected firms from the sample. The gray area corresponds to the range in which the different estimated CARs fall, and is enclosed by the minimum and the maximum estimated value. Within the gray area, the solid line is the mean of the estimated CAR, and the broken lines represent the 25th and 75th percentiles values of the CAR. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G8 summit held on June 27, 1996 , June 18, 1999 , and July 8, 2005 Financial Times, June 17, 1995 October 9, 1995 World Bank's Policy-Setting Development Committee. The committee calls for the bank and the IMF to make proposals, in time for its next meeting in April, for dealing with the debts owed to multilateral institutions by a handful of poor countries.
Financial Times, October 10, 1995 March 14, 1996 World Bank board meeting. A joint proposal with the IMF, which aims to provide a comprehensive resolution of the external debt problems faced by the world's poorest countries over a six-year span, is approved by the World Bank. This is the first attempt by these multilateral creditors on their debt relief proposal. However, the use of IMF's reserved gold is not considered.
New York Times, June 10, 1996; Financial Times, March 14, 1996 April 21, 1996 IMF and World Bank spring meeting. G7 financial ministers reject the joint proposal.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 23, June 10, 1996
June 4, 1996 Revised proposal by the World Bank. The revised plan proposes to sell the IMF's gold as well as to cut the waiting time for countries qualifying for multilateral debt relief from six to three years.
Guardian (London), June 10, 1996
June 27, 1996 G7 finance meeting and G8 summit in Lyon, France. The proposal is accepted, except the idea of IMF's gold sales to finance debt relief, which Germany strongly opposes. Options for financing is yet to be finalized.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 28, 1996 September 29-30, 1996 Annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. The HIPC initiative is approved by the IMF and World Bank. Agreement by the G7 nations to increase debt cancellation from 67% (decided in Naples Terms in 1994) to a maximum of 80% is followed by the approval of the initiative.
Financial Times (London), September 30, 1996
April 1, 1997 Meeting at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Leading African finance policymakers with top policymakers from the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank discuss the African debt problem. Criticism on slow and insufficient process of the initiative is raised.
Africa News, April 1, 1997
September 16, 1997 Commonwealth finance ministers meeting in Mauritius. U.K. chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, urges more rapid and generous implementation of the current initiative.
Financial Times (London) September, 20, 1997
May 17, 1998 G8 summit in Birmingham, U.K. The members issue a statement "supporting the speedy and determined extension of debt relief to more countries within the terms of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. . . . We encourage all eligible countries to take policy measures needed to embark on the process as soon as possible, so that all can be in the process by the year 2000."
Financial Times (London), June 2, 1998; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 17, 1998
September 8 and 10, 1998 World Bank and IMF executive boards. A plan by the bank and IMF is agreed to make more countries eligible for relief.
Economist, September 12, 1998
September 16, 1998 UNCTAD Report. The report says debt relief for Africa is still insufficient and too slow, although it welcomes the HIPC initiative. It calls for an independent body consisting of eminent persons from the finance and development fields, agreed on by creditors and debtors, to be formed to assess the sustainability of debt.
Business Day (South Africa), September 17, 1998, UNCTAD report (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr1998_en.pdf)
March 16, 1999 U.S. State Department conference. In the presence of representatives from 46 African nations, President Clinton proposes moves to forgive $70 billion in global debt to those countries advocated by the G7 countries, the IMF, and the World Bank.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 16, 1999 April 28, 1999 IMF and World Bank spring meeting. The bank and IMF called for "broader, deeper and faster" debt relief for the HIPCs, but indicated clearly they would take instructions from the industrialized nations on exactly how to do that.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 28, 1999 
